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Abstract
On 12 October 2018, the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced 
Studies hosted the third Annual Conference of the Florence 
Competition Programme (FCP) at the European University 
Institute’s (EUI’s) campus in Florence.  e conference discussed 
the challenges that are linked to abuses of Standard Essential 
Patents (SEPs) vis-à-vis the extra-territorial enforcement of 
competition law. Following a keynote speech, delivered by Guil-
laume Loriot, Director for Markets and Cases II: Information, 
Communication and Media of DG Competition at the European 
Commission, the event was divided into two panels, which dealt, 
respectively, with: i) Licensing SEPs and the question of when 
the license terms are Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory; 
and ii) SEPs and extraterritorial competition law enforcement. 
 e  nal roundtable discussion focused on the role of Standard-
Setting (or Development) Organisations (SSOs or SDOs) in 
preventing competition law infringements.  e event gathered 
several di erent stakeholders, including competition enforcers 
and representatives from academia, industry, law and economic 
consulting  rms.  e diversity of views ensured a lively debate 
throughout the event.  e present Policy Brief summarises the 
main points raised during the discussion while seeking to stim-
ulate further debate.
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Keynote Speech - Standards Essential 
Patents (SEPs) and Competition:  e EU 
perspective
 e opening keynote set the scene for the conference 
by presenting the European perspective on the rela-
tionship between SEPs and competition, and high-
lighting the importance of standardization for the 
successful rollout and take up of 5G. It was noted 
that, while competition issues around SEPs may arise 
in the context of mergers, the debate is dominated 
by the issues that arise in the application of Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU. Article 101 becomes particularly 
relevant in respect of standardization agreements 
and SSOs. While such agreements can generate sig-
ni cant e  ciencies by ensuring, amongst others, 
compatibility and interoperability between prod-
ucts, and, as such, play an important role in boosting 
innovation, by their very nature they are also prone 
to anti-competitive behaviors. For this reason, it is 
extremely important that SSOs operate transpar-
ently, and that they adopt and follow clear rules.  e 
risk of abusive unilateral conduct in the context of 
standardization, on the other hand, arises in respect 
of the dominant position of an SEP patent hold-up.1
It is thus clear that SEPs can involve both collusion 
and exclusionary practices and, accordingly, the 
question of whether one is more harmful than the 
other can be answered only in the context of a spe-
ci c case. 
Conceptually, competition law raises two important 
issues in the context of SEPs: one of patent hold-
up, and the other of patent hold-out. Traditionally, 
the former has raised more concerns and attracted 
more scrutiny than the latter. However, in light of 
the ongoing debate in the US and recent statements 
made by the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) and 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), it seems that 
attention is shi ing towards patent hold-out by 
implementers, where implementers threaten to use 
1.  Competition issues raised by SEPs and standardization have re-
cently been analysed by the CJEU in Huawei v. ZTE, in which the 
Court ruled that the holder of an SEP that had agreed to license 
its patent on FRAND terms, may violate Article 102 TFEU, and 
competition rules in general, when seeking an injunction against 
a potential licensee in certain circumstances. See Case C-170/13, 
Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v ZTE Corp., ECLI:EU:C:2015:477.
a given technology without acquiring licenses from 
the innovator, an issue which may be as, or even 
more, problematic than patent hold-up by patent 
owners. 
Certainly, striking the right balance between the 
interests of all the involved parties, namely, the 
patent holders, the implementers and the users, is 
not an easy task, but it is precisely what the Com-
mission is committed to achieving.2 Accordingly, the 
high-level message that the European Commission 
seeks to convey is that while an SEP’s holder, on the 
one hand, should not be allowed to claim an injunc-
tion, implementers, on the other, must be willing 
to agree to FRAND terms.  e overall objective, as 
mentioned earlier, is therefore to ensure a fair bal-
ance between various competing interests, and not 
to protect the interest of just one side.  is balancing 
approach that is pursued by the European Commis-
sion has also been endorsed by EU courts. 
In addition to advocating a balanced approach, the 
Commission is also committed to promoting a pre-
dictable framework, and, in general, a more trans-
parent and open approach to SEPs. It is for this 
reason that, in November, 2017, the Commission 
adopted a separate Communication on SEPs, which 
sets out a legal framework and o ers guidance and 
recommendations on how to make the system more 
transparent, and how to secure e ective enforce-
ment whilst curbing the risk of abusive litigation.3  
 e keynote was concluded with two takeaway mes-
sages. First, competition law provides a set of gen-
eral rules and principles that apply in the context 
of standardization. Controversies that arise in their 
application can be resolved at the national level, as 
national courts are well equipped to deal with spe-
ci c issues. Second, given the importance of stand-
ardization for 5G and IoT for the Digital Single 
Market and the overall competitiveness of the Euro-
pean economy, it is essential to avoid abusive litiga-
2.  e Commission’s Motorola and Samsung decisions were in-
voked during the keynote as a proof of its commitment to pro-
moting such a balanced approach. 
3.  Communication from the Commission to the European Par-
liament, the Council and the European Economic and Social 
Committee, Setting out the EU Approach to Standard Essential 
Patents, Brussels, 29.11.2017, COM(2017) 712  nal.
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tion that may slow down the evolution and take-up 
of these technologies. 
Panel I – Licensing SEPs: when are the 
license terms Fair, Reasonable and Non-
discriminatory?
During the  rst session of the Conference, speakers 
pointed out that technical (or industry) standards 
play a vital role in the hyper-connected era, since 
they support innovation and growth in rapidly 
developing markets while providing for the interop-
erability of digital technologies.  ey then recalled 
that the need to establish ‘Fair’, ‘Reasonable’ and 
‘Non-Discriminatory’ (FRAND) commitments on 
SEP holders originates from SSO’s attempt to coun-
terbalance the negative e ects produced by the abuse 
of patent positions. Actually, there exists a long his-
tory of patent licensing commitments that have been 
made, even outside of the standard-setting context, 
both in the United States and in Europe, years before 
SSOs considered the adoption of this approach for 
the  rst time.4
However, the bene ts related to the establishment 
of a standard come with some anticompetitive costs, 
primarily because the process brings together com-
petitors that have an inherent incentive to restrict 
competition amongst themselves. In this respect, 
the most crucial concerns relate to the enforce-
ment of the patent rights covering technology that 
is essential to implement a standard.  ese are o en 
referred to as Standard Essential Patents (SEPs). 
4. From World War II until the 1970s, American courts issued 
more than one hundred orders addressing issues related to pat-
ent licensing on the basis of terms that were ‘fair’, ‘reasonable’ 
and ‘non-discriminatory’. See Jorge L. Contreras, A Brief History 
of FRAND: Analyzing Current Debates in Standard Setting and 
Antitrust through a Historical Lens, 2015, 80 Antitrust Law Jour-
nal 39. For instance, in U.S. v. Terminal Railroad Association of 
St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912), 38 transport companies alleged-
ly conspired to prevent competitors from using every feasible 
means of railroad access to St. Louis.  e Supreme Court ruled 
that the conduct had to be regarded as being an unlawful re-
straint of trade, and that membership had to be accessible to ‘any 
existing or future railroad’ on ‘such just and reasonable terms 
as shall place such applying company upon a plane of equality 
in respect of bene ts and burdens with the present proprietary 
companies’ 
Once a standard is created, SEPs’ holders/innovators 
can license the rights to their SEPs in exchange for a 
royalty that may be unfair and unreasonable (exces-
sive) in relation to the value of the technology. Other 
forms of opportunistic behavior may entail discrimi-
natory fees, or even a refusal to license SEPs. 
It was thus argued that the role played by FRAND5 is 
essential within SSOs, as SEP holders are called upon 
to accept a voluntary commitment to license a patent 
on terms that are capable of making the technology 
available to all of its potential implementers. In this 
scenario, SEP holders are adequately rewarded for 
the use of the patent and are also encouraged to con-
tinue investing in R&D activities. Overall, FRAND 
commitments facilitates the widespread use of 
standards and insures that each SEP holder bene ts 
from use of the patent without gaining an unfair bar-
gaining advantage, ‘holding up’ the manufacturers of 
standard compliant goods. In this respect, FRAND 
commitments may be regarded as a means for har-
monizing the private interests of patent holders with 
the public interests of SSOs. 
Speakers then remarked that there is no regulation 
that imposes a FRAND obligation, which is merely a 
contractual commitment made by the patent holder 
to the SSO, and not to the general public. It was clari-
 ed that, besides referring to SEP holders’ commit-
ments to negotiate licenses, the concept of FRAND 
also relates to the licensing terms themselves. Espe-
cially in the latter case, this can be regarded as being 
multi-dimensional, involving a number of condi-
tions, such as, for example, the existence of reci-
procity; grantbacks; defensive suspensions; the cov-
erage of future releases of a standard, as well as the 
duration of the license.  
A er stressing that the assessment of whether 
FRAND terms distort or impair competition law 
is independent from the FRAND analysis itself, 
speakers introduced an EU perspective to the debate. 
It was underlined that both the Commission and the 
5. vAlso referred to as RAND when encompassing only ‘reason-
able’ and ‘non-discriminatory’ terms, or F/RAND policies. In 
practice, the three terms are generally interchangeable; howev-
er, FRAND seems to be preferred in Europe and RAND in the 
U.S.A.
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national courts tend not to intervene much in intel-
lectual property rights (IPRs) and matters that are 
related to them, as they remain subject to domestic 
legislation. Hence, a very careful approach has 
been always adopted in this respect and not much 
exact guidance has been provided on what FRAND 
entails. However, some useful indications come from 
the European Commission’s Guidelines on the appli-
cability of Art. 101 TFEU6, according to which there 
exist di erent methods to establish whether the 
fees charged for access to IPR in the standard-set-
ting context are fair or reasonable in the case of a 
dispute. Recalling previous case law, and, in partic-
ular, the United Brands case,7 the Commission holds 
that fees should bear a reasonable relationship to the 
economic value of the IPR, also acknowledging that 
there exist several di erent methods that can be used 
to conduct this type of assessment.
At this stage of the discussion, speakers illustrated 
SSOs’ typical IPR policy goals, focusing on the case of 
the European Telecommunications Institute (ETSI) 
in order to better clarify to what exactly FRAND 
refers. In this respect, it was noted that ETSI’s policy8
makes it very clear that:
(i)  e creation of standards and technical speci-
 cations is to be based on solutions ‘which best 
meet the technical objectives of the European 
telecommunications sector’. 
(ii)  ETSI has to ensure that ‘investment in the 
preparation, adoption and application of stan-
dards’ by its members is not wasted as a result 
of an essential IPR being unavailable. 
(iii)  Under this framework, the organization 
remains in charge of rewarding IPR holders 
in a fair and adequate way for the use of their 
6. Communication from the Commission, Guidelines on the appli-
cability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Eu-
ropean Union in horizontal co-operation agreements, 14.1.2011, 
C 11/01.
7. United Brands Company and United Brands Continental BV v 
Commission of the European Communities, judgment of 14 Feb-
ruary 1978, C 27/76.
8. ETSI’s IPRs Policy can be found in its 2018 Rules of Proce-
dure: https://www.etsi.org/images/ les/IPR/etsi-ipr-policy.pdf.
IPRs in the implementation of standards and 
technical speci cations. 
(iv) Last, but not least, ETSI is required to take 
all reasonable measures to make sure that its 
activities enable standards and technical spec-
i cations to be available to future potential 
users. 
 e main conclusion was that all these elements 
should co-exist, and they should be balanced 
amongst each other in an adequate way in order that 
the con icting interests of the stakeholders involved 
in the standardization process within an SSO are 
harmonized.
Panel II – SEPs and Extra-territorial 
Competition Law Enforcement 
As of today, over 100 countries have developed and 
adopted competition law regimes and established 
competent enforcement authorities. While such 
widespread adoption is altogether commendable, it 
also increases the risk of inconsistent decisions when 
a  rm’s behavior falls under the revisions of di erent 
competition authorities, which, in turn, increases the 
cost of doing business for multi-national  rms.  is 
globalisation of antitrust enforcement occurs also in 
the context of SEPs.  is, in itself, is not surprising, 
as many SEP holders, which  nd themselves subject 
to investigation by multiple competition authorities, 
operate globally. In fact, parallel investigations o en 
focus on the potentially abusive unilateral conduct 
of SEPs’ holders.  e assessment of such behavior is 
challenging as,  rstly, national approaches to unilat-
eral conduct may vary considerably amongst juris-
dictions, and, secondly, the remedies adopted in 
such cases will o en have an extra-territorial reach. 
 e fact that unilateral conduct is assessed di er-
ently and that some jurisdictions may be more inter-
ventionist than others, explains why convergence in 
respect of SEP licensing is unlikely. Still, there are 
some areas where some degree of convergence may 
develop. For instance, there is a growing recognition 
that a balance between the interests of SEP holders 
and SEP implementers is needed, or that injunctions 
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should not be excluded, but should be limited to cer-
tain circumstances. 
Next, participants remarked that the judicial 
enforcement of SEPs in a global context requires one 
to consider that a growing number of jurisdictions 
have not only developed competition law, but also 
proper IP law regimes. However, since IP rights are 
territorial in nature, their enforcement is pursued on 
a national basis.  is, in turn, can lead to di erent 
outcomes on a number of aspects, including the 
analysis of FRAND terms. 
Certainly, the increasing interdependence of markets 
in a globalized economy means that the behavior of 
market players, especially those who operate on a 
global scale, produces e ects that are not restricted 
to just one jurisdiction. If the e ects of given con-
duct can be disentangled into those that materialize 
in the domestic market and those in a foreign ter-
ritory, then a competition authority has jurisdic-
tion only over the part of the conduct that produces 
domestic e ects. Naturally, if the e ects cannot be 
disentangled, the authority unavoidably exercises 
jurisdiction over the whole conduct. 
To the extent that a given conduct produces e ects 
in various jurisdictions, competition authorities in 
the a ected jurisdictions may review the same con-
duct and adopt measures against it.  is, in turn, 
raises the question of whether there are limits on the 
exercise of jurisdiction to avoid instances of double 
jeopardy, over-enforcement, and of overlapping or 
con icting remedies.
 e question of con icting remedies is important, 
given that competition authorities enjoy signi -
cant discretion in their formulation.9 Comity, for 
example, could help limit the scope of remedies. 
However, there is no hard rule concerning comity 
that is consistently applied across jurisdictions. Still, 
9. For example, in the USA, in the Polypore v FTC case (11th Cir. July 
11, 2012), which concerned a merger divestiture in Austria, did 
not discuss the impact of divestiture on the EU market. Likewise, 
in the EU, in Standard & Poor’s, the Commission held that ‘in 
some circumstances remedies may have to be worldwide in scope 
in order to ensure fair competition inside the EEA.’ European 
Commission (2011), Case COMP/39.592 – Standard & Poor’s. 
as illustrated by the recent OECD Roundtable,10 it 
is expected that extra-territorial application will 
become a growing problem, and comity will become 
more important.
To conclude, parallel investigations may create the 
risk of con icting decisions, forum shopping, and 
may increase costs for both claimants and defendants. 
Given that the emergence of a global antitrust or IP 
regime is unlikely, it was noted that e orts should 
be directed towards areas where greater convergence 
is feasible. It was also recalled that extra-territorial 
application is an exception, and, as such, it should be 
applied cautiously and restrictively. 
Roundtable Discussion –  e Role of 
SSOs in Preventing Competition Law 
Infringements
Given the coexistence of the con icting interests of 
members within SSOs, the risk of delaying the wide-
spread use of standardized technologies through 
disputes in negotiations between the parties, is very 
high.  is, in turn, may hamper the development of 
interconnected products, both in Europe and glob-
ally. First, speakers focused on analysis of the 2017 
European Commission’s Communication on SEPs, 
which forms part of the wider EU Digital Single 
Market (DSM) Strategy for the purpose of investi-
gating whether the guidance provided in the doc-
ument may help to solve some of the most critical 
competition challenges related to SEPs. It was noted 
that the  rst section of the Communication deals 
with the fundamental requirements for FRAND 
license negotiations, holding that SSOs’ databases, 
which currently collect mere declarations on SEPs, 
should be kept up-to-date. For the same purposes, 
f providing greater transparency, quality, and acces-
sibility to relevant information, it is recommended 
that SEP holders provide su  ciently detailed decla-
rations and that the exact scope of the application of 
a patent, vis-à-vis the standard, is clari ed. Further-
10. OECD (2017), Roundtable on the Extraterritorial Reach of 
Competition Remedies, DAF/COMP/WP3(2017)4, available at: 
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WP3(2017)4/en/
pdf.
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more, it is provided that these declarations are sub-
ject to a reliable scrutiny of the part concerning their 
essentiality, which cannot just be based on a self-as-
sessment that is made by the patent holder. 
Speakers held that the Communication does not 
substantiate a concrete proposal in this respect, as 
it merely states that the actual bene ts of increased 
scrutiny will have to be balanced against the costs 
of such a review. In the same vein, it was argued 
that, even though the actual impact produced by the 
Communication on essentiality checks is not likely 
to be massive, introducing higher costs would de -
nitely produce anti-competitive e ects by harming 
SMEs and start-ups. A di erent strand of the debate 
remarked that, in order for SSOs to cope with all the 
anti-competitive concerns that are related to trans-
parency, mandatory rules on essentiality checks 
should be imposed, as, currently, its regulation is 
entrusted only to the Communication’s non-binding 
provisions. Speakers also analysed the main features 
of the Commission’s approach to SEP licensing, 
which calls on SSOs and patent holders to develop 
e ective solutions so as to facilitate the process via 
patent pools and other platforms, agreeing that there 
is no one-size- ts-all solution in regard to what 
FRAND is, as what may be considered fair and rea-
sonable may di er from sector to sector and over 
time.
 e discussion thus explored whether, and to what 
extent, SSOs may contribute to the prevention of 
competition law infringements from a broader per-
spective. It was noted that a rather inactive role taken 
by SSOs in the  eld of unilateral abuses, is likely to 
be the result of the common belief that these types of 
issues may not undermine the process of the adop-
tion of a standard. At the same time, it was stressed 
that SSOs have made some positive e orts, especially 
in the area of excessive pricing, adopting policies sug-
gesting that SEP holders disclose information con-
cerning the maximum amount of their royalty fee, 
and, a few years ago, they started discussions on how 
to calculate such fees. Finally, the debate focused on 
the controversial changes to IPR policy that one of 
the largest SSOs, the Institute of Electrical and Elec-
tronics Engineers-Standards Association (IEEE-SA), 
adopted in February 2015. Speakers explained that 
due to the anticompetitive concerns that the new 
policy had raised, the IEEE-SA had requested from 
the Antitrust Division of the US DoJ the issuance of 
a Business Review Letter (BRL), a letter which pos-
itively assessed the increased clarity concerning the 
meaning of the FRAND commitments that were 
brought about by the update. According to the DoJ, 
such greater clarity was in a position to foster ex-ante
competition among technologies for incorporation 
into the standard, while mitigating patent hold-up 
at the same time. However, it was argued that, 
according to some commentators, DOJ’s conclusion 
appears to be based on policy preferences, rather 
than on a careful rule of reason analysis. In conclu-
sion, technological developments and increasing 
needs for  standardization strongly suggest that the 
theory and the jurisprudence of SEPs will consti-
tute, for many years, not only a fruitful ground for 
research on competition law and economics but, 
most of all, a major  eld for global confrontation and 
enforcement.  
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